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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and FiV A 
B. WEL·CHMAN, 
Plaintvffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
MERRILL J. WOOD, d/b/a Wood 
Realty Company, and MILO D. 
CARTER, 





This is an appeal from the dismissal with prejudice 
of plaintiffs' action for damages for breach of a contract 
of agency, or in the alternative, for restitution of a com-
mission paid to defendants by plaintiffs. The order of 
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dismissal was made at the trial of the action, following 
statements of plaintiffs' counsel to the jury and to the 
court of plaintiffs' proposed evidence. 
This constitutes the second appeal by plaintiffs in 
the action, the case having come up on appeal from a 
summary judgment, as case number 8718, and a decision 
in plaintiffs' favor having been rendered therein on 
March 28, 1959 (337 P2d 410). 
Throughout this brief, R indicates pages of the 
record, and D pages of the deposition that has been 
published in the action. Italicized emphasis throughout 
has been added by appellants. The following statement 
of facts was taken from appellants' brief in the first 
appeal, to which has now been added additional details 
bearing upon the points now before this court. 
STATEJ\1:ENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs had a pressing need for money, in order 
to pay debts. They decided to sell their house to raise 
it (D. 34, 35). Accordingly, they entered into a written 
listing agreen1ent with defendant Wood on 1\iarch 8, 
1956 (D. 4; R. 43). This listing agreen1ent did notre-
quire a trade of properties. It provided, in handwriting, 
"Will exchange for money," and in the fine print on the 
reverse side was the provision, " ... If I agree to an 
exchange of said property, ... " (R. 43). 
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Wood assigned his salesman, defendant Carter, to 
seek a buyer (D. 15). Defendants did not present plain-
tiffs with any offer until April 28, 1956. On that day 
Carter came to plaintiffs with an offer from a couple by 
the name of Granger to exchange their residence valued 
at $10,000 for plaintiffs' residence valued at $21,000, with 
the balance, after adjusting equities, to be paid to plain-
tiffs by Grangers in monthly installments, under a real 
estate contract (D. 14, 9). 
Plaintiffs were at first unwilling to accept Grangers' 
offer because it would not produce the cash that they 
sorely needed (R. 1; D. 14, 27, 32). Carter assured them 
that they would obtain sufficient cash from the trans-
action because defendants could make available to them 
$8,600 under an F.H.A. loan on the Granger house, 
which would result in almost $3,500 net cash for plain~ 
tiffs, and defendants could sell their proposed real estate 
contract with Grangers for at least $4,000 cash (R. 1; 
D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 35, 36). Plaintiffs expressed con-
cern that defendants might not be able to make available 
these sums. 
They asked Carter a number of times if he was sure 
that defendants could get such a loan and could sell such 
a real estate contract for at least $4,000 - that if ~e 
wasn't, it would be better not to sell the house (D. 27; 
R. 29-31). Carter assured them that there was nothing 
to worry about. He said, "I will see that you get this 
loan. I .will sell your contract for no less than four 
thousand dollars, and thereby you can attain your 
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money." (R. 29). He discussed the matter with Wood 
over the phone and promised them that these amounts 
would be forthcoming (R. 1; D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 36, 37). 
Solely in reliance upon Carter's representations, 
promises and assurances, and in consideration thereof, 
plaintiffs agreed with defendants to make the trade with 
Grangers (R. 1; D. 9, 14, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39). Defendants 
thereby became entitled to receive a commission of $1,050 
from plaintiffs plus an additional commission of almost 
$500 from Grangers, none of which they would have 
been entitled to otherwise unless they had produced a 
buyer who would "exchange for rnoney" (R. 1, 31; D. 10, 
11, 37). Plaintiffs acting in reliance upon this oral 
modification completed the transaction 'vith Grangers 
and subsequently paid the commission to defendants, so 
that plaintiffs fully performed everything that they 
agreed to perform under the new agreen1ent ·with de-
fendants (R. 2; D. 10, 11, 12, 32, 37, 39, -!2~ 43). B:T com-
pleting the trade with the third party, Grangers, plain-
tiffs materially and irrevocably changed their position. 
Defendants failed to 1nake available to plaintiffs any 
F.H.A. financing, because of a substantial defect in the 
foundation of the house (Grangers') to be financed, and 
failed to sell the Granger contract for $4,000, because 
they found no one who would buy it at that price (R. 2~ 
D. 30, 17, 19, 37). As a result, plaintiffs incurred heavy 
damages (R. 2, 3; D. 20-24, 3l, 38, 39). 
4 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED EVIDENCE SHOWS AN 
AGREEMENT BY DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN PARTICU-
LAR RESULTS, REGARDLESS OF THE RISK OF IMPOS-
SIBILITY. 
POINT II 
IT IS A QUESTION OF FACT, FOR THE JURY, TO 
DETERMINE WHE'THER OR NOT PERFORMANCE WAS 
IMPOSSIBLE. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs are entitled to have their proposed evi-
dence, and every fair inference fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in the light most favorable to them, in deter-
mining whether or not this nonsuit was proper. 53 Am 
Jur 264, Trial, §§327, 313, 314. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED EVIDENCE SHOWS AN 
AGREEMENT BY DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN PARTICU-
LAR RESULTS, REGARDLESS OF THE RISK OF IMPOS-
SIBILITY. 
In Williston on Contracts (Revised Student Edi-
tion) 908, §1934, it is stated: 
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" 'A man may contract that a future event 
shall come to pass over which he has no, or only 
limited, power.' Sage v. Hampe, 235 U. S. 99, 
104, 35 S. Ct. 94, 59 A. Ed. 14 7. 'If the occurren~e 
of an event which is not within hu1nan control 1s 
in terms promised the words are interpreted as 
a promise to be a~swerable for proximate harm 
unless the event occurs.' Rest., Contracts, §457 
Comment b. Not only rnay such a promise be 
binding in case of supervening impossibility but 
it also may be binding though performance was 
impossible when the promise was made. Indeed, 
such promises are common . . .'' 
The trial court and defendants' counsel have charac-
terized the question of assumption of risk of impossibili-
ty of performance as a question of "warranty" (R. 15, 
19, 20, 36). Such designation seems appropriate and will 
be followed somewhat by appellants herein. 
As Arnell Welchman recalls the conversation on 
April 18, 1956, Carter 1nade repeated "assurances" that 
the particular results would be forthcoming. " .. A __ ssure", 
"insure", "guarantee" and "warrant" are essentially 
synonymous. A definite and certain assurance to obtain 
a particular result can in law constitute a warranty. 
The trial Court ruled that "a statement of events 
that can occur, that will occur, but all futu're" does not 
constitute a warranty (R. 20). The court said that he 
does not believe that Carter's "statements of assurance 
and the statement that he did say that this could be done" 
has legal effect of warranty (R. 20). The court seemed 
to disregard the definition of warranty, which includes 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
certain promises that future events will come to pass, as 
well . as certain representations as to present facts. 
Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed), at page 1832, defines 
warranty, as used in contracts, as, "An undertaking or 
stipulation, in writing, or verbally, that a certain fact 
in relation to the subject of a contract is or shall be as 
it is ·stated or promised to be." See the Sales Act, UCA, 
1953, 60-1-12, which in defining express warranty de-
clares that, "Any affirmation of fact or any promise" is 
a warranty under certain circumstances. 
It is stated at 46 Am J ur 494, Sales, §313, Express 
Warranties, Generally : 
" ... A seller may give a warranty against a 
future event. It is to be noted that the statutory 
definition of an express warranty includes any 
promise of the seller relating to the goods. To 
constitute an express warranty, the term "war.,; 
rant" need not be used; no technical set of words 
is required, and a warranty may be inferred from 
the affirmation of a fact which induces the pur-
chase and on which the buyer relies and on which 
the seller intended that he should so do. It is not 
necessary that the warranty be in writing; a valid 
warranty may be made orally, and, if so made1 
will be given the same effect as a written one, ... " 
Arnell .Welchman could not recall the exact language 
used by Garter, but he is definite and certain that such 
language constituted repeated assurances that the money 
would be forthcoming from the sources promised. Plain-
tiffs made clear to him that an exchange of properties 
would do them no good unless it produced money. With 
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knowledge of this,· Carter gave them assurances that 
defendants would obtain money for them in such ways: 
R. 16, line 26: " ... he at that time assured 
us ... " 
R. 17, line 9: " ... He assured us he could." 
R. 17, line 28 : "He did guarantee to me a 
certain sum.'' 
R. 18, line 5 : "That is what they assured us." 
R. 18, line 20: "That was the figure he had 
assured us he could do- that was the figure he 
promised us he would be able to do, he assured 
us, because we were worried. We. asked him a 
number of times if he was sure, and if he wasn't, 
the way things stand, it would be better not to 
sell the house." 
R. 25, line 2: "Mr. Carter assured us ... " 
R. 29, line 16: "[Carter said] 'I will see that 
you get this loan.' He said that 'I will sell your 
contract for no less than four thousand dollars 
and thereby you can attain your n1onev.' That is 
the thing I questioned in the whole de~l. He said 
he could do this and that, and I doubted because 
I was lacking experience in the matters, but he 
said he could, so I took his word for it; ... " 
R. 31, line 14: "He said that he could sell the 
contract for no less than four thousand dollars 
and he said that he would be able to finance th~ 
home. He assured us." 
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These statements must be viewed in reference to the 
entire situation between the parties, and particularly in 
light of plaintiffs' statements to Carter of their ultimate, 
and essential, purpose. It is a matter of properly inter-
preting the new, orally modified, contract. 12 Am Jur, 
Contracts, sets out certain well-recognized rules of in-
terpretation, as follows: 
At page 754, §231 : ". . . The language of a 
prmnisor is to be interpreted in the sense in 
which he knew or in which he had reason to sup-
pose it was understood by the promisee. Stated 
in slightly different words, the language and acts 
of a party to a contract are to receive such a 
construction as at the time he supposed the other 
party would give them or such a construction as 
the other party was fairly justified in giving to 
them, and he will not at a later time be permitted 
to give them a different operation in consequence 
of some mental reservation .... " 
At page 776, §242: "There can be no doubt 
that the court may look beyond the form into 
which the parties have cast their agreement. The 
spirit and purpose of an agreement as well as 
its letter must be regarded in the interpretation 
and application thereof. In fact, it is the sub-
stance of an agreement rather than its form -
the spirit rather than the letter - which must 
control its interpretation .... " 
At page 777, §242: " ... All contracts must 
be interpreted with reference to their subject 
matter .... As an aid to ascertaining what the 
parties intended and understood by the words 
employed, the object in making the agreement 
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may be taken into consideration. · Schofield v · 
Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst. 85. Utah, 281, 39 P. 
( 2d) 342, 96 A.L.R. 1083 ; Anderson v. Great 
Eastern Casualty Co. 51 Utah 78, 168 P. 966. · · · 
It is always of much importance in the inte~preta­
tion of a contract upon which doubt ans.es to 
ascertain what was the attitude of the parties to 
the subject and to find out what was their main 
purpose and object in making it. If this can be 
done, the terms of the contract will be so inter-
preted as to promote the main purpose, if the 
language employed will fairly permit such con-
struction. . . ." 
. At page 785, §247: " ... In interpreting an 
agreement, a court should, to the best of its 
ability, place itself in the situation occupied by 
the parties when the agreement was made and 
avail itself of the same light which the parties 
possessed when the agreement was made so as to 
judge of the meaning of the words and of the 
correct application of the langauge to the things 
described .... General or indefinite terms con-
tained in a contract may be explained or re-
stricted by the circumstances surrounding its ex-
ecution. The scope and application of most words 
vary according to the nature of the subject under 
discussion and the circumstances under which 
they are used. " 
At page 792, §250: " ... Where the language 
of an agreement is contradictory, obscure, or anl-
biguous, or where its n1eaning is doubtful so that 
it is susceptible of two constructions, one ~f which 
rnakes it fair, custon1ary, and such as prudent 
men would naturally execute, while the other 
makes it inequitable, unusual, or such as reason-
able rnen would not be likely to enter into, the 
10 
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interpretation which makes a rational and prob-
able agreement must be preferred. The inter-
pretation of any instrument ought to be broad 
enough to allow it to operate fairly and justly 
under all the conditions to which it may apply. 
A court will not place an unjust interpretation 
upon a contract, unless the terms thereof compel 
it to do so .... " 
In Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 
160 Ill. 85, 43 N.E. 77 4, the principle is stated: 
"Courts will seek to discover and give effect 
to the intention of the parties, in construing a 
contract, so that performance may be enforced 
according ot the sense in which they mutually 
understood it at the time it was made, and greater 
regard is to be had to their clear intent than to 
any particular words which they may have used 
to express it." 
It is respectfully submitted that application of the 
foregoing legal principles to plaintiffs' proposed evi-
dence presents substantially more than a scintilla of evi-
dence of a material nature and that, accordingly, the 
dismissal was improper and a jury question is presented. 
POINT II 
IT IS A QUESTION OF FACT, FOR THE JURY, TO 
DETERMINE WHE1THER OR NOT PERFORMANCE WAS 
IMPOSSIBLE. 
It is immaterial whether or not defendants assumed 
the risk that their performance might . be impossible if 
in fact performance was possible. 
11 
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Paragraph 2 of the First Cause of Action of the 
complaint alleges the assumption by defendants of the 
risk that their performance might be impossible. It does 
not allege that performance was in fact impossible. Par-
agraph 4 alleges that defendants failed to make available 
to plaintiffs FHA financing because of a substantial 
defect in the foundation of the house to be financed, and 
failed to sell the Uniform Real Estate Contract for 
$4,000, because no one would buy it at that price. It is 
not alleged that the foundation defect vvas not correctible 
or that the contract could not be sold for an amount not 
substantially less than $4,000. 
It is true that it was impossible to obtain an FHA 
loan on the house as the foundation then stood, but it 
is nowhere stated that the defect was not correctible. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs have treated, and now treat, this 
portion of the April 28th agreement as having become 
impossible for defendants to perform. They do not so 
treat the other promise. 
Arnell Welchman was willing to accept somewhat 
less than $4,000 for the real estate contract (D. 16), and 
in the opening statement to the jury, plaintiffs' counsel 
stated that plaintiffs' evidence would show that the 
contract was actually resold for over $3,800 by the 1nan 
who ultimately bought it from plaintiffs. (R. 12). Under 
defendants' general denial it, therefore, remains an issue 
of fact, for the jury, to detennine whether or not per-
formance of such portion of defendants' promises, with 
only an unsubstantial variation, was possible. See Re-
statement of Contracts, §463. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' proposed evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiffs, does show an agreement 
by defendants to obtain particular results, regardless of 
the risk of impossibility. 
It is a question of fact, for the jury, to determine 
whether or not performance of at least a portion of 
defendants promises was possible. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs respectfully submit that the 
order of dismissal should be vacated. 
VICTOR A. SPENCER 
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